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Editorial on the Research Topic
Owning a Body+Moving a Body=Me?
Bodily self-consciousness involves awareness of being the embodied subject of our experience
and of residing in and controlling a physical body. Such bodily self-awareness is ubiquitous
and stands at the root of human nature (James, 1890). Indeed, sensing the body allows us to
distinguish ourselves from the external world and shapes our identity. Currently, there is a
wide consensus that the experience of our own body relies on at least two key neurocognitive
components (Gallagher, 2000): the sense of agency (i.e., the feeling of authorship over one’s
own willed actions/thoughts) and the sense of body ownership (i.e., the sense that the
physical body is experienced as mine). The sense of agency is thought to be rooted in
efference copy mechanisms predicting the sensory consequences of the movements, and the
resulting feedback (Haggard, 2008). In contrast, body ownership arises from the integration
of body-related afferent signals (e.g., visual, somatic) that constantly reach our own body
(Ehrsson, 2012; Kilteni et al., 2015).
Despite widespread agreement that a coherent experience of the bodily self emerges
from the complex interplay between the sense of agency and the sense of body ownership,
the character, and the form of this bond is not perfectly understood. Indeed, despite the
increasing interest in the past years we do not conclusively know to which extent these two
experiences interact, at both the behavioral and neural level. It is crucial to understand whether
these agency related processes change actually the perceptual processes underlying the sense
of ownership.
We have started to examine this relationship more closely, for example by using
experimental manipulations of body ownership in healthy participants such as the rubber
hand illusion (e.g., Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012) or through investigating stroke-induced
disorders of body awareness (e.g., Pia et al., 2016). This, in turn, has informed philosophical
investigations on the bodily self and consciousness (De Vignemont, 2018; Wong,
2018). Our current research topic highlights the need to look at body ownership and
sense of agency as a joint process in bodily self-awareness. Here we provide a brief
overview of the contributions to the research topic, focusing on general themes that
have emerged.
Amongst the non-original research articles, Gallagher defends the phenomenological
nature of body ownership from deflationary and eliminativist critiques.
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He argues that a phenomenological point of view sees
ownership to be intrinsic to any experience and that pre-
reflective self-awareness subserves ownership. In their
meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature (Zapparoli
et al.) show that the three subcomponents of intentionality
(i.e., content, timing, and the possibility of generating
an action) are anatomically and functionally segregated
within the human brain. Lastly, another paper reviews
studies of disorders of the bodily self in schizophrenia.
Klaver and Dijkerman propose that a weaker internal
representation of one’s own body can be considered a
clinical subcomponent of schizophrenia. This, in turn,
would render schizophrenic patients more susceptible to
external stimulation.
Our original research articles make use of a variety of
approaches, most notably, using virtual reality applications
to manipulate perceptual input. Pritchard et al. for instance,
implemented the rubber hand illusion paradigm using virtual
reality. They investigate how incoming sensory signals affect
ownership and agency. The data shows that the visual form,
the plausibility, and the spatiotemporal integration of afferent
input differentially affects ownership and agency. Similarly,
another study (Ratcliffe and Newport) employs a virtual hand
illusion paradigm which examines to what extent visual,
spatial, and temporal properties of one’s own hand affects
action embodiment and body ownership. The authors show
that visuomotor synchrony is sufficient to trigger agency, but
not ownership, for which additional body-related visuospatial
information is required. Harjunen et al. employ a virtual
bimodal oddball task to study if vision of one’s own body affects
visuo-tactile interaction in endogenous spatial attention at
different levels of visual and somatosensory processing. Results
show that seeing one’s own body affects cross-modal spatial
attention and that this is reflected in early and late-sensory
ERPs. Some other original research articles examine different
pathological conditions, which affect the experience of one’s own
body. Rabellino et al. investigate whether traumatic experiences
influence bodily perception. The authors administer the rubber
hand illusion paradigm in individuals affected by Post Traumatic
Stress Disorders (PTSD). The authors found that in PTSD there
is a lower susceptibility to the illusion. Alfaro et al. present a rare
case of alien hand syndrome in which a patient perceives her
arm as having a “mind of its own.” This condition prevented her
from playing piano. In the light of the patient’s brain damage,
which includes the parietal lobe, the authors interpreted this
abnormal motor control and anomalous self-body perception as
a disruption of efferent outputs. Kanayama et al. examine
neuroanatomical variations in relation to a self-report
questionnaire measuring general experience of ownership
and agency. Their voxel-based morphometry results show a
negative correlation between ownership experience and insular
gray matter volumes. Kashihara et al. examine the role of body
ownership on the emergence of the observation inflation effect
(OI)—a false memory phenomenon in which people falsely
report having achieved an action when, in fact, they have only
observed the action by another person. Indeed, their data shows
that bodily self-consciousness has a key role in the emergence of
such an effect.
One paper engaged in translational research (Raghavan et al.)
attempt to exploit the current knowledge about the bodily self
to treat disorders of the bodily self. The authors administered
the Music Upper Limb Therapy-Integrated (MULT-I) to stroke
patients, who exhibit a variety of symptoms related to the
bodily self. They show that this intervention is effective in re-
creating patients’ sense of self because it allows for the integration
of sensorimotor/emotional information and facilitates recovery
across multiple domains of disability.
In summary, the present Research Topic suggests that body
ownership and sense of agency do not arbitrarily co-occur in
our experiences but, rather, can have a significant influence
on each other and might even share some neuroanatomical
and functional features. Future studies should continue to
examine the complex relationship between ownership and
agency in healthy as well as pathological conditions affecting
bodily awareness. Finally, the development of next-generation
prosthetic devices and virtual-reality applications may engender
new approaches in neuroscience, rehabilitative medicine,
and therapy.
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